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Judicial Ethics Advisory Committees Should Render
Opinions Which Adhere to Binding United States
Constitutional Precedents
HonorableHowland W. Abramson and Gary Lee*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial ethics advisory committees provide legal advice to
judges who inquire whether their prospective conduct is prohibited or permitted by the judicial ethics code which applies in their
jurisdiction.' In rendering their advice, judicial ethics advisory
committees, at the very least, should adhere to binding precedents
applying the United States Constitution to the judicial ethics code.
When First Amendment rights are involved, judicial ethics advisory committees should apply traditional First Amendment doctrine, and only limit First Amendment rights when it is determined that there is a compelling state interest and that the rule,
canon or regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.2
Although it may seem elementary that judicial ethics advisory
committees should consider applying binding constitutional prece* The Honorable Howland W. Abramson, Chairman, Judicial Ethics Committee,
Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges; Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of the
First Judicial District (Philadelphia County) of Pennsylvania; J.D., Temple University
Beasley School of Law, 1975; M.B.A. Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania,
1972; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1970. Judge Abramson was for a decade of his
legal career a state's attorney who represented the judicial branch of Pennsylvania state
government and all its instrumentalities. Gary Lee, Esquire, law clerk to Judicial Ethics
Committee, Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges; solo practitioner; J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1979. The opinions expressed herein are solely the authors' and are not the opinions of the Judicial Ethics Committee of the Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges.
1. There are judicial ethics advisory bodies for the federal courts, 36 states, and the
District of Columbia. American Judicature Society Model Procedural Rules for Judicial
Ethics Advisory Committees (1996), app. A; D. SOLOMON, THE DIGEST OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

OPINIONS vii (1991). In most jurisdictions, such judicial ethics advisory opinions are not
binding, but may be considered as a defense or in mitigation of discipline. J. SHAMAN, ET.
AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 1.11 (3d ed. 2000). However, in some jurisdictions,
judicial ethics advisory opinions although not binding are considered to have precedential
weight or to be admissible in any disciplinary proceeding involving the inquiring judge.
American Judicature Society Model Procedural Rules for Judicial Ethics Advisory Committees (1996), app. A, Minnesota, West Virginia.
2. This concept is known as strict scrutiny. For application of this doctrine, see, e.g.,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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dents to judicial ethics codes in rendering advice, historically, this
has not always been the practice.3 For example, some judicial ethics advisory committees have declined to consider the application
of constitutional law to judicial ethics questions on the ground
that their responsibility does not extend to rendering legal advice
or interpreting the United States Constitution.4
Moreover, some commentators consider that judges have no
constitutional rights which they can raise to challenge judicial
ethics provisions because they are deemed to have waived their
rights when they assumed office.' In contrast, in judicial ethics
litigation, many courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have held that various provisions of judicial ethics codes
violated the First Amendment or have revised judicial ethics codes
to comply with the United States Constitution.6
If state courts would be bound by precedents applying the
United States Constitution to the state judicial ethics codes, judicial ethics advisory committees likewise should not give advice
inconsistent with those precedents. Whenever a judge seeks ethics advice from a judicial ethics advisory committee on a matter
implicating constitutional rights, the committee should satisfy
itself that there is a compelling state interest that overrides such
rights before issuing an opinion prohibiting their exercise.7
For instance, in Application of Gaulkin, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey reversed its previous policy and permitted the wife of
a New Jersey judge to seek elective office, holding that the wife's
First Amendment right should not be infringed. 8 The court stated:
"Where a court is dealing with a First Amendment right (here the
political involvement of the non-judicial spouse), fears that its exercise will have undesirable consequences cannot inhibit judicial
vindication thereof."9

3. See, e.g., Louisiana Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion 61 (August 31, 1984);
Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion 19 (April 10, 1974). The Preface to the ABA
1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides that the Code "should be applied consistent
with constitutional requirements..." This is discussed in more detail infra note 15 and
accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., supra note 3.
5. One of the authors of this article, Judge Abramson, has encountered this view at
judicial ethics education programs. Because this view is expressed orally, it is not subject
to the scrutiny and debate that would occur if it were expressed in writing.
6. See, infra text at note 25 et seq.
7. See supra note 2.
8. Application of Gaulkin, 351 A.2d 740 (N.J. 1976).
9. Id. at 747.
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To the extent judicial ethics advisory committees fail to consider
binding constitutional precedents, they deviate from the custom
and tradition of discussing all pertinent legal issues in legal opinions;"0 they may fail to meet the expectations of the inquiring
judge; they undermine respect for and compliance with their opinions;" and they foster a view that the committees' opinions are
arbitrary or not well-grounded in law. When judicial ethics advisory committees render opinions interpreting judicial ethics code
provisions in derogation of constitutional rights, a variety of hardships is created. In addition to chilling judges' exercise of constitutional rights, these actions may cause judges to needlessly
spend time and money seeking declaratory relief to avoid the risk
of discipline; may cause judges to risk a disciplinary prosecution in
which judges' failure to comply with committees' constitutionally
incorrect advice may be used against them;" may deprive judges of
favorable advisory opinions which judges can use to defend
against judicial ethics prosecutions; and may deter judges from
seeking the committees' advice in the future.
This article will discuss the cases in which judicial ethics code
provisions have been challenged on constitutional grounds. 3 The
10. A legal opinion has been defined as:
[a) written document in which an attorney provides his or her understanding of the
law as applied to assumed facts. The attorney may be a private attorney or attorney
representing the state or other governmental entity. Private attorneys frequently
render legal opinions on the ownership of real estate or minerals, insurance coverage,
and corporate transactions. A party may be entitled to rely on a legal opinion, depending on factors such as the identity of the parties to whom the opinion was addressed and the law governing these opinions.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (7th Ed. 1999).
11. Canon 7B(1)(a) of the 1972 Code requires a judge who is a candidate for judicial
elective office to "encourage members of his family to adhere to the same standards of political conduct that apply" to the judge. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(B)(1)(a).
Under Canon 7 of the 1972 Code, a judge cannot, among other things, hold office in a political organization and cannot speak in support of a candidate for nonjudicial office. If a judicial ethics advisory committee rendered an opinion that required the judge to discourage
the judge's spouse from engaging in such activity, the committee's opinion would be viewed
as obviously in derogation of the spouse's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Gaulkin, 351 A.2d
740.
12. Judges who may wish to seek administrative judicial positions or other judicial
office, especially when such other judicial offices are filled by election, risk the use of a
judicial disciplinary proceeding against their candidacy even if they ultimately prevail in
the disciplinary proceeding. See In re Voorhees, 739 S.W. 2d 178, 186 (Mo. 1987) ("Even a
successful defense does not completely erase the effect of widely published charges.").
13. Some of the articles which discuss judicial ethics and speech in certain contexts are:
Richard A. Dove, National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection: Judicial Campaign
Conduct: Rules, Education, and Enforcement, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1447 (2001); William G.
Ross, ExtrajudicialSpeech: Navigating Perils and Avoiding Pitfalls, 38 COURT REVIEW 36
(2001); Stephen J. Fortunato, On a Judge's Duty to Speak Extrajudicially:Rethinking the
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recent United States Supreme Court decision, Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, holding that a judicial ethics provision violated the First Amendment, illustrates the constitutional issues
involved in the interpretation of judicial ethics provisions. 14 Other
federal and state court cases interpreting the First Amendment in
accordance with judicial ethics codes will also be examined. On
the basis of this review of applicable case law, we conclude that
judicial ethics advisory committees should render advice consistent with the First Amendment.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND ETHICS CODES IN GENERAL
Judges and judicial candidates do not, by virtue of their status,
give up their rights as citizens. 5 Rather, judges and judicial canStrategy of Silence, 12 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 679 (1999); Max Minzner, Gagged
but not Bound: The Ineffectiveness of the Rules Governing Judicial Campaign Speech, 68
UMKC L. REV. 209 (1999); Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical Campaigningfor the Judiciary, 29
TEX. TECH L. REV. 811 (1998); Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning up Judicial
Elections: Examining the FirstAmendment Limitations on Judicial CampaignRegulation,
2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 71 (1997); Stephen B. Brigl.t & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital
Cases, 75 B.U.L. REV. 760 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Sound of the Gavel: Perspectives
on Judicial Speech: Is it the Siren's Call?: Judges and Free Speech While Cases Are Pending, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 831 (1995); Abbie G. Baynes, Judicial Speech: A FirstAmendment
Analysis, 6 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 81 (1992); Martin J. McMahon, First Amendment Protection for Judges or Government Attorneys Subjected to Discharge, Transfer, or
Discipline Because of Speech, 108 A.L.R. FED. 117 (1992); Gerald Uelmen, Disqualification
of Judges for Campaign Support or Opposition, 3 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 419
(1990); James J. Alfini and Terrence J. Brooks, Perspectives on the Selection of Federal
Judges: Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election Campaigns: A Review and Critique of
Canon 7, 77 KY, L.J. 671 (1989); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology, Judicial Selection and
Judicial Ethics, 2 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 64 (1989); Steven Lubet, Professor Polonius Advises Judge Laertes: Rules, Good Taste And the Scope of Public Comment, 2
GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 665 (1989); William G. Ross, ExtrajudicialSpeech: Charting
the Boundaries of Propriety, 2 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 589 (1989); William G. Ross,
Rules for Extrajudicial Speech: Too Broad and Too Narrow, 2 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL
ETHICS 691 (1989); Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionalityand Consequences of Restrictions
on Campaign Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1987); Leonard E. Gross, JudicialSpeech: Discipline and the FirstAmendment, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1181 (1986).
14. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
15. E. W. Thode, REPORTER'S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 95 (1973).
The 1990 Code 41 Commentary provides: "[a] judge has the rights of any other citizen,
including the right to privacy of the judge's financial affairs, except to the extent that limitations established by law are required to safeguard the proper performance of the judge's
duties." The 1972 Code 5C (6) Commentary is substantially the same. ABA CANONS OF
JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924) Canon 28 provided:
While entitled to entertain his personal views of political questions, and while not required to surrender his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion
of being warped by political bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active promoter of the interests of one political party as against another.
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didates retain their constitutional rights. The Preamble to the
ABA 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides, in part: "The
Canons and Sections are rules of reason. They should be applied
consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court
rules and decisional law and in the context of all relevant circumstances."'6 Because of a concern with federal constitutional rights,
the 1990 Code also revised the 1972 Code by broadening both the
permissible speech of judicial candidates and the permissible
speech of judges about pending or upcoming cases."
Each state adopts its own version of the model code. Commentary to a provision of the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct expressly states that "[r]estrictions on the personal conduct of judges
cannot, however, be so onerous as to deprive them of fundamental
freedoms enjoyed by other citizens." 8 Similarly, the California
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[]udges are entitled to
entertain their personal views on political questions. They are not
required to surrender their rights or opinions as citizens." 9 One
legal commentator has likewise observed that "[b]y becoming a

The 1990 Code 2A Commentary provides:
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by
judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge
must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
ABA COMPENDIUM OF PROF. RESP. RULES AND STANDARDS 275.
The 1972 Code 2A Commentary is substantially the same.
16. ABA COMPENDIUM OF PROF. REsP. RULES AND STANDARDS 271 (emphasis added).
17. The 1990 Code 5A(3)(d)(ii) replaced the 1972 Code 7B(1)(c)'s broad prohibition
against a candidate's announcing the candidate's views on disputed legal or political issues
with the narrower one against making statements that appear improperly to commit the
candidate with respect to matters likely to come before the candidate's court... . The [1990
Code] Committee believed its revised rule to be more in line with constitutional guarantees
of free speech, while preventing the harm that can come from statements damaging the
appearance of judicial integrity and impartiality. MILORD, DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA
JUDICIAL CODE 50 (1992).
The 1990 Code 3A(9) prohibits, while a case is pending or upcoming, a judge from
making any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or
impair its fairness. The 1990 Code Committee believed that the 1972 Code 3A (6) provisions prohibiting a judge from making any public comment about a pending or upcoming
case were overbroad and unenforceable. MILORD, supra at 21.
The Federal Judicial Conference, the District of Columbia, and all of the states
except Montana have judicial ethics codes which are based upon the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (1990), the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1972), or a combination
of the two. J. SHAMAN, supra note 1, at 1.02.
18. Wisconsin SCR Ann. 60.03 (1).
19. CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 5.
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judge, a citizen does not surrender his First Amendment right to
free speech.""
III. ROLE OF A JUDICIAL ETHICS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The American Judicature Society has suggested model rules and
a guide for judicial ethics advisory committees. 2 1 One of its model
rules prohibits the committee from issuing "an advisory opinion
that interprets any constitutional provision, statute, rule or regulation that does not relate to judicial ethics."22 This suggested
model rule would forbid a committee from expressing an opinion
that a provision
of the code of judicial conduct violates the federal
3
constitution.
The idea that a judicial ethics advisory committee should refrain from adhering to binding constitutional precedents in rendering opinions to judges ignores the growing body of judicial
precedent limiting or abolishing judicial ethics provisions on the
basis of the United States Constitution and, as has been previously discussed, imposes on judges seeking opinions the cost and
expense of instituting suit, defending suit, or foregoing the exercise of constitutional rights. The matter is worse if a jurisdiction
permits the judicial ethics advisory committee's opinion to be used
against the inquiring judge if the judge does not follow the committee's advice. 4

20. William Ross, Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2
GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 594 text at n.19 (1989); discussing In re Sanders, 955
P.2d 369, 375 (1993), discussed infra note 135 and accompanying text..
21. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY MODEL PROCEDURAL RULES FOR JUDICIAL ETHICS
ADVISORY COMMITrEES (1996).
22. Id. at Rule 22.
23. Note to AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY MODEL PROCEDURAL RULES FOR JUDICIAL
ETHICS ADVISORY COMMITTEES (1996) Rule 22.
24. However, if a judicial ethics advisory committee is expressly constrained by the law
or rule which creates the committee from considering the application of the United States
Constitution to an ethics inquiry, the committee may have no choice.
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IV. JUDICIAL ETHICS CASES INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

A.

Campaign Speech
1.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, a 5 to 4 decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(I) (the "announce clause"),
which prohibited candidates for judicial office from announcing
their views on disputed legal or political issues, violated the First
Amendment. 5 The Minnesota Canon at issue was "based on
Canon 7(B) of the 1972 American Bar Association (ABA) Model
Code of Judicial Conduct."26
In upholding the announce clause, the Eight Circuit had relied
on the widespread practice arising over the past half-century forbidding judicial candidates from discussing disputed legal and political issues. 27 In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court noted that there was no historical basis for the prohibition
and that, in the modern era, many jurisdictions permitted such
speech.28
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the prohibition banned a candidate's statement of his current position, even
if the candidate did not promise to maintain that position after the
election. 29 The Court reached that conclusion because another
provision of the Minnesota Code prohibited "judicial candidates
from making pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office." 0
The district court had construed the announce clause to include
only disputed issues that were likely to come before the court on
25. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002). Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas joined. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy filed concurring
opinions. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer joined. Because of this United States Supreme Court decision, the
holdings of previous cases involving the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates no
longer may be sound.
26. Id. at 700.
27. Id. at 711.
28. Id. at 711-712.
29. Id. at 702.
30. White, 536 U.S. at 702 (citing Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(A)(3)(d)
(2002)).
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which the candidate would sit if elected.3 The court of appeals
approved this construction, also holding that the announce clause
permitted candidates to participate in "general discussions of case
law and judicial philosophy."3 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted these constructions."'
However, the United States Supreme Court noted that respondents, responsible for enforcing the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct, conceded that the announce clause prohibited candidates
from criticizing past court decisions if the candidates also stated
that they were not bound by stare decisis.34 The Supreme Court
stated that limiting the announce clause to issues likely to come
before a court was not much of a limitation because the issues
raised in an election campaign will be those which are within a
state court's purview and that "[t]here is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a judge of an American
court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction."35 Justice Scalia
also observed that permitting a discussion of general case law and
philosophy was of little help in an election campaign because candidates were prohibited from explaining their judicial philosophy
by applying it to issues likely to come before the court.36 He summarized the impact of the announce clause as follows:
[Tihe announce clause prohibits a judicial candidate from
stating his views on any specific nonfanciful legal question
within the province of the court for which he is running, except in the context of discussing past decisions and in the latter context as well, if he expresses the view that he is not
bound by stare decisis."7
The parties agreed that, because of the First Amendment issues
involved, the strict scrutiny test applied."s Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment, the announce
31. Id.
32. Id. at 702-03.
33. Id. at 703.
34. Id.
35. Republican Party of Minnesota, 536 U.S. at 703 (citing Buckley v. Illinois Judicial
Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)).
36. Republican Partyof Minnesota, 536 U.S. at 703.
37. Id. at 703 - 704.
38. Id. at 704. In cases where speech restrictions are content-based, the Court applies
a strict or exacting scrutiny standard. These restrictions are valid only if "necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and.. .narrowly drawn to that end." See LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 798-99 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Perry Education
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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clause had to have been "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest."3 9 Respondents asserted that the announce clause
served two compelling state interests: "preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the appearance of impartiality of the state judiciary."' °
Justice Scalia discussed three different meanings of "impartiality" in the opinion. The first, that a judge applies the law to all
parties the same way, meant that Minnesota Canon was not narrowly tailored to serve the state interest because it prohibited discussion about particular issues, not discussion for or against particular parties.41 If impartiality meant lack of a preconceived view
on particular legal issues, then it could not serve a compelling
state interest because impartiality had never been considered necessary for equal justice and it is nearly impossible for a judge not
to have preconceived views about the law.42 Lastly, if impartiality
meant openmindedness, then the Court thought it was unlikely
that the Minnesota Supreme Court enacted the announce clause
for that purpose because public commitments to legal views were
"an infinitesimal portion of the public commitments to legal positions that judges (or judges-to-be) undertake." 3 The Supreme
Court noted that many times before becoming a judge a person
makes legal commitments on issues that the person will be faced
with as a judge and may have made such legal commitments as a
judge, a law teacher, an author, or a speaker.44
Justice Scalia went on to note that the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4B encouraged a judge to teach, write and
speak about the law.4'5 Because under the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct a judge could make such statements about the law
both pre- and (until litigation is pending) post-election the Supreme Court held that "the announce clause was so woefully underinclusive" in serving openmindedness as to make it "a challenge to the credulous" that it was to serve that purpose. 46 Thus,
39. White, 536 U.S. at 704.
40. Id. at 704 - 705.
41. Id. at 705.
42. Id. at 706.
43. Id. at 707.
44. White, 536 U.S. at 707.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Supreme Court's decision has brought about several changes in other jurisdictions, including the following: The Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission withdrew
an advisory opinion in which it had stated that a judicial candidate could not answer a
questionnaire that asked for the candidate's views and which would be used by an organization in preparing a voter's guide. Alabama Advisory Opinion 00-763. The California
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the announce clause was struck down as violative of the First
Amendment.
2.

Priorstate supreme court and federal court decisions

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White represented a watershed moment for First Amendment jurisprudence in the area of
judicial ethics. However, White was not the first case to have addressed this issue in the context of judicial campaign speech. In
addition to the United States Supreme Court, several state supreme courts and the lower federal courts have interpreted judicial canons implicating a judge or judicial candidate's First
Amendment rights. Prior to White, the state and federal courts
were split as to the constitutionality of these provisions. The following sections examine these past state and federal court decisions in the shadow of White.
a.

State and federal court cases holdingjudicial campaign speech restrictionsunconstitutional

In Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that its canon of judicial ethics,
which restricted campaign speech, was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.47 Canon 7B(2) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial
Ethics provided:

Commission on Judicial Performance dismissed charges which had been filed against a
judge for statements the judge had made duringa judicial campaign. Inquiry Concerning
Former Judge Patricia Gray, dismissal
order
of August 27,
2002,
at
www.cjp.ca.gov/pubdisc.htm. The Supreme Court of Missouri has issued an order stating
that the "announce clause" would not be enforced. Supreme Court order July 18, 2002, at:
http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf/d45a7635d4bfdb8f8625662000632638/flc626db4
da8b14086256bfa0073b302?OpenDocument. The Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has issued an advisory opinion which contains mandatory speech guidelines for judicial candidates. Ohio Advisory Opinion 2002-8. The Texas
Supreme Court amended the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct in several respects, including
striking Canon 5(1), which had prohibited statements indicating an opinion "on any issue
that may be subject to judicial interpretation" by the office a judge holds or a candidate
seeks. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court amended the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B(1)(c) striking the "announce clause" and inserting language prohibiting a
candidate from making "statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court." In re:
Amendment of Canon 7B(1)(c) of Judicial Conduct, 2002 Pa. LEXIS 3194 (Nov. 21, 2002).
47. Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission, 802 So. 2d 207 (Ala. 2001).
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Campaign Communications. During the course of any campaign for nomination or election to judicial office, a candidate
shall not, by any means, do any of the following:
Post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute
false information concerning a judicial candidate or an opponent, either knowing the information to be false or with reckless disregard of whether the information is false; or post,
publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute true information about a judicial candidate or an opponent that
would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person."
Applying strict scrutiny, the Alabama court found a compelling
state interest in the challenged provision to protect the reputation
and integrity of the judiciary." However, because the canon's latter clause applied to statements which were not false, but rather
that a "reasonable person" would deem "deceiving or misleading,"
and to statements which the candidate did not make knowing of
their falsity, the court found that the canon was overbroad and
thus failed strict scrutiny."0 Because the Alabama court was ultimately responsible for the rule, the court narrowed the canon to
prohibit a judicial candidate from disseminating "[d]emonstrably
false information about a judicial candidate or an opponent with
knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether or
not it is false."5'
In Weaver v. Bonner, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that judicial ethics provisions of the Georgia
Code of Judicial Conduct that restricted campaign speech and
prohibited candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds
and publicly-stated support were unconstitutional."
Canon
7(B)(1)(d) of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct provided that
judges and candidates for judicial office:
[s]hall not use or participate in the use of any form of public
communication which the candidate knows or reasonably
should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or
contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits
a fact necessary to make the communication considered as a
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 213 (citing Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics Canon 7(B)(1)(d)).
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
Weaver v.Bonner,309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
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whole not materially misleading or which is likely to create an
unjustified expectation about results the candidate can
achieve."
Canon 7(B)(2) of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct provided
that judges and candidates for judicial office "shall not themselves
solicit campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support."54 However, Canon 7(B)(2) further provided that a judicial candidate
could establish an election committee to solicit campaign funds
and publicly stated support."
The court determined that the canon was subject to strict scrutiny.56 The state argued that the canon served the compelling interests of "preserving the integrity, impartiality, and independence of the judiciary" and "ensuring the integrity of the electoral
process and protecting voters from confusion and undue influence." 7 The Eleventh Circuit held that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) was not
narrowly tailored to serve the stated interests because it prohibited "false statements negligently made and true statements that
[were] misleading or deceptive."58
The court went on to declare that the state's interest in judicial
impartiality was not "substantially advanced" by the canon.59 In
the court's view, judicial impartiality was undermined by the
practice of electing judges, not the judges' conduct during the
campaign, because the practice of electing judges provided a motive for judicial candidates to say and do that which would increase the likelihood that they would be elected."0 Additionally,
the standard for judicial elections should be the same as the standard for legislative and executive elections.6 '
Also, because the canon's provisions prohibiting a candidate
from personally soliciting campaign funds and publicly stated
support were not narrowly tailored to advance the state's interest
in judicial impartiality, the provision failed the strict scrutiny
test." The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the need for campaign
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1315 (citing Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)(d)).
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1315 (citing Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(2)).
Id.
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1320.
Id.
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
Id. at 1322.
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funds and endorsements did not imply that candidates who were
elected would be partial and the risk of partiality was not reduced
significantly by allowing judicial candidates' agents to solicit funds
and endorsements.63
The Supreme Court of Michigan considered a similar canon restricting the speech of judicial candidates and held that, because
the candidate's right to discuss public issues and advocate his own
election was a core First Amendment right, the canon was not
narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster." The court did
find that there were compelling state interests of "preventing
fraud and libel;" "preserving the integrity of the election process;"
"protecting the process from distortions caused by false statements;" "preserving the integrity of the judiciary;" "preserving
public confidence in the judiciary;" "promoting the appearance of
fairness and impartiality of the judiciary;" and in "protecting the
reputation of the judiciary." 5 However, because the canon applied
to statements that went beyond those government interests, the
canon was overbroad.66 The Michigan court amended the canon to
provide that a candidate for judicial office "should not knowingly,
or with reckless disregard, use or participate in the use of any
form of public communication that is false."67 The court also declared that it would apply an objective standard for determining
whether the canon was violated.
In Beshear v. Butt, an Arkansas judicial candidate stated that if
elected he would not accept "plea bargaining."69 A judicial disciplinary proceeding was filed against the candidate, who sought an
injunction in federal district court to halt that proceeding. 0 The
court held that overbroad provisions of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct which restricted statements judicial candidates were
63. Id. at 1322-23.
64. In re Chmura, 608 N.W. 2d 31 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 828 (2000). The canon
at issue provided that:
a candidate for judicial office, including an incumbent judge, should not use or participate in the use of any form of public communication that the candidate knows or
reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains
a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading, or which is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve.
Id. (citing Canon 7(B)(1)(d) of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct).
65. Chmura, 608 N.W. 2d at 40.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 43.
68. Id. at 43-44.
69. Beshear v. Butt, 863 F. Supp. 913, 914 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
70. Id. at 915.
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permitted to make violated the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution by chilling the exercise of the judicial candidate's constitutional rights.71
In Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an Illinois rule
limiting statements that a judicial candidate could make while
campaigning violated the First Amendment.72 The rule at issue
was similar to the announce clause later struck down by the
United States Supreme Court in White. The district court had
construed the portion of the rule prohibiting candidates from stating their views on disputed legal or political issues as being restricted to statements on issues likely to come before the judge in
a case. 73
The court of appeals noted that the Illinois rule was designed to
prevent candidates from making commitments to decide particular
cases in a certain way because candidates would be pressured to
rule that way if they won the election.74 Such pressure would im71. Id. at 917-18. The provisions of the Arkansas Code were:
Canon 7(B)(1)(c) of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct states:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce views
on disputed legal or political issues; or, knowingly misrepresent his identity,
qualifications, present position or other fact.
Id. at 916 (citingArkansas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)(c)).
Canon 5 (A)(3)(d) of the Revised Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted in 1993,
states:
A candidate for a judicial office:
(d) shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
(ii) announce views on disputed legal or political issues; or
(iii) knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position
or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent.
Beshear, 863 F. Supp. at 916 (citing Revised Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
5(A)(3)(d)).
72. Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993). The provision
at issue was Illinois Supreme Court Rule 67(B)(1)(c), which provides, in part:
a candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office filled by election or retention... should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on
disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity.. .or other fact; provided, however, that he may announce his views on measures to improve the law, the
legal system, or the administration ofjustice, if, in doing so, he does not cast doubt on
his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him.
Buckley, 997 F.2d at 225 (citing Illinois Supreme Court Rule 67(B)(1)(c)).
73. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 226.
74. Id. at 228.

Winter 2003

Judicial Ethics Advisory Committees

283

pair the judge's ability to decide impartially and would impair the
credibility of the judge's decision to the losing party and to the
community.7" The court acknowledged that the problem with
drafting such a rule was that commitments could be both explicit
and implicit.76 The court recognized that a candidate, without
making explicit commitments or taking sides, could be perceived
by voters as advancing a certain position, even though the candidate did not expressly make a pledge, promise, or commitment.7 7
The court observed that the pledges or promises clause of the
Illinois rule banned all pledges or promises, even those which did
not pledge to decide a particular case a particular way and the
announce clause was not limited to announcements that the candidate would decide a particular case a particular way."
The court held that the rule was overbroad in violation of the
First Amendment. 9 The Seventh Circuit additionally noted that
anything a candidate said about disputed legal or political issues
could be interpreted as compromising the candidate's ability to try
cases impartially."s Moreover, the district court's attempt to save
the rule by adding language was unsuccessful because "[t]here is
almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a
judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction."8"
Kentucky's Code of Judicial Conduct has been challenged in
several fora. In J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., the Supreme Court of Ken75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228.
79. Id. at 231.
80. Id. at 229.
81. Id. Although counsel requested the court make additional revisions to the rule to
restrict its reach, the court held that it was not authorized to do so. Id. at 230. In American
Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla.
1990), a Florida federal district court also considered a similar judicial canon and determined that it violated the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates. Canon 7(B)(1)(c)
of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct provided that:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled either by
public election between competing candidates or on the basis of a merit system election ...
should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
ACLU of Florida, 744 F. Supp. at 1096 (citing Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
7(B)(1)(c)). The court held that, except for information about the candidates' background,
this canon effectively proscribed announcements on almost every issue that might be of
interest to the public and the candidates in a judicial race. ACLU of Florida, 744 F.Supp.
at 1098.
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tucky held that certain provisions of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B(1), a version of Kentucky's "pledges and
promises" and announce clauses, violated the First Amendment.8 2
Although the court agreed that the state had a compelling interest
in protecting and preserving the "integrity and objectivity of the
judicial system," it found that the canon was not narrowly tailored
and instead banned all statements of a candidate's views on disputed legal or political questions.83
In Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement and Removal
Commission, a judicial candidate challenged the same canon's
speech restrictions. 4 The candidate desired to make "pledges,
promises and statements which would commit or appear to commit him with respect to administrative matters..." These matters
included an alleged backlog of cases, methods of assignment of
cases, numbers of pending cases, hiring and firing of employees,
and administrative expenses relating to travel."8 The candidate
also desired "to make statements which would commit or appear
to commit him on general legal issues which were not presently
before the Kentucky Court of Appeals" in any identifiable cases."
"Such issues included a general discussion of the right of privacy,
82. J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W. 2d 953 (Ky. 1991), cert. denied sub noma.Judicial
Retirement & Removal Comm'n v. Combs, 502 U.S. 816 (1991). Kentucky Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 7B (1) provided, in pertinent part, that a candidate for judicial office
'should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, ... [and] should not make
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance
of the duties of office; [or] announce his views on disputed legal or political issues...
J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d at 955.
83. Id. at 956.
84. Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission, 776 F. Supp.
309 (W.D. Ky. 1991). The canon at issue, Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B(1),
provided:
CANON 7: A judge should refrain from political activity inappropriate to his judicial
office.
B. Campaign Conduct.
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge for a judicial office that is
filled either by public election between competing candidates or on the
basis of a merit system election:
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; make
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect
to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court;
or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other
facts.
Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 311 (citing Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)).
85. Ackerson, 776 F.Supp. at 311.
86. Id.
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the role of United States Supreme Court precedent, and the adoption of federal evidence rules in Kentucky state courts."7
The Kentucky district court stated that "[w]hile candidates for
elective judicial office are not without the protection of the First
Amendment, their campaign conduct has been regulated to a
greater degree than non-judicial candidates."88 That being said,
the court held that, because it did not impinge upon the impartiality of the judiciary, the state had no compelling interest to restrict
a judicial candidate's speech on administrative matters. 9 The
Kentucky District Court rejected the candidate's other constitutional challenges on the ground that the canon prohibiting speechmaking commitments about legal issues which were likely to come
before the court withstood the strict scrutiny test.9° The Kentucky
Supreme
Court upheld the Ackerman rationale in two later
91
cases.

The Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline considered the effect of the First Amendment in In re Miller, where a complaint
was filled against a judicial candidate alleging that the candidate
misrepresented his qualifications and position." Canon 7 of the
Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct provided, in relevant part
"[a] candidate.. .for a judicial office that is filled... by public election
between competing candidates.. .should not.. .misrepresent his
identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact."93 The
court found that there were not misrepresentations, and thus
there was no need to address the constitutional issues. The majority observed, however, that to comply with the First Amendment,
the ban of Canon 7B(1)(c) could not be extended beyond "false
campaign statements knowingly or recklessly made."9" Therefore,
the majority stated that banning the following would violate the
First Amendment:
a. [presumably] false statements negligently made,

87. Id.
88. Id. at 313. This is contrary to the Eight Circuit holding in Suster v. Marshall, 149
F.3d 523, discussed infra note 123 and accompanying text.
89. Ackerson, 776 F.Supp. at 314.
90. Id. at 315.
91. Summe v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission, 947 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. 1997)
and Deters v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission, 873 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994).
92. In re Miller, 759 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2000).
93. Id. at 458 (citing Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7).
94. Miller, 759 A.2d at 467-68, (citing Leadbetter, J., concurring).
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b. truthful statements "carelessly or incompletely communicated,"
c.
"technically truthful [statements] which mislead the recipient,"
d. truthful statements "which the maker knows or believes
to be materially misleading because of [their] failure to state
additional or qualifying matter,"
e.
[presumably] false statements made with a degree of
mental culpability less than that required for negligent
statements,
f.
"half-truths,"
g.
"misleading generalizations,"
h. "materials which might have any tendency to be misunderstood." 5
b.

State and federal court cases upholding restrictions
on judicial campaign speech

In Stretton v. DisciplinaryBoard of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct provision limiting a judicial candidate from announcing his views on disputed
legal and political issues and prohibiting a judicial candidate from
personally soliciting campaign funds did not violate the First
Amendment.9 6 The Third Circuit agreed with the defendants that
the "disputed legal or political issues" of the disputed canon included only those issues likely to come before the court and additionally predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
construe the canon with that limitation. 7 The court went on to
decide that, with the limitation, the canon's announce clause did
not violate the First Amendment.9 8
95. Id. at 468 (footnotes omitted). The concurring opinion would permit the regulation
of this campaign speech believed by the majority to be protected by the First Amendment.
96. Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 944 F.2d 137
(3d Cir. 1991). Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7 provides, in pertinent part:
B. Campaign Conduct.
(1) A candidate ...
for a judicial office ...
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his
identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141 (citing Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct (1974)).
97. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142-44.
98. Id. at 144.
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In analyzing the ban that prevented a candidate from personally soliciting campaign funds, the court agreed with the district
court's analysis that there were "compelling state interests in preventing the reality and appearance of political corruption as well
as in the necessity of assuring an impartial judiciary."9 The candidate argued that "since candidates are permitted to participate
indirectly in the solicitation of funds, and they inevitably learn
who did, or did not, contribute, it is but a tiny and credible step to
allow direct personal participation."' ° However, the court found
that the canon was sufficiently tailored to survive First Amendment attack.1" '
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld a Code of Judicial Conduct provision which prohibited a judge from attending political
gatherings in Matter of Buckson.' °2 The provision had been challenged as void for vagueness as applied to the judge's activities. 3
The judge, after publicly announcing his intention to seek the
nomination for Delaware governor, attended various political caucuses."0 The court held that as applied to the judge's conduct, the
term "political gathering" was sufficiently definite to withstand a
void for vagueness challenge.'
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio found that Ohio's announce clause passed constitutional
scrutiny in Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio. ° The court held
99. Id. at 145. The Third Circuit cited the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 7(B)(2) as providing "that a candidate 'should not himself solicit or accept campaign
funds.'" Id. at 145 (citingPennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct (1974)).
100. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 145
101. Id. at 146.
102. 610 A.2d 203 (Del. 1992).
103. The Delaware Code of Judicial Conduct provided in pertinent part:
CANON 7
A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity Inappropriate to His Judicial

Office
A. A judge should not:
(3) Solicit funds for or pay an assessment or make a contribution to a political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or purchase
tickets for political party dinners, or other functions.
Id. at 206-07.
104. Buckson, 610 A.2d at 208.
105. Id. at 224-25. The Buckson court also upheld a Code of Judicial Conduct provision
that required a judge to resign to run for non-judicial office. For a further discussion of this
issue, see Section IV (E) infra, particularly the discussion of Morial v. Judiciary Commission of State ofLouisiana.
106. 598 F.Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984), affd, 861 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1108 (1989). The district court opinion is discussed because the court of appeals
per curiam opinion is relatively brief. Ohio's announce clause provided:

288

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 41

that the canon did not prohibit a candidate from criticizing court
administration or an incumbent judge if the criticism was not untrue and was not misleading."°7 The district court held that a candidate could pledge "to increase the judge's personal involvement
in the administration and resolution of cases, and to attempt to
encourage more direct dispute resolution among the parties themselves." °8 The court rejected the argument that the pledges clause
of the canon was unconstitutionally void for vagueness.
In addition to the First Amendment argument in Berger, the
plaintiff contended that the canon violated equal protection because it treated judges differently from legislators and members of
the executive branch."' In court's opinion, however, because "[a]
judge acts on individual cases, not broad programs," it was not
appropriate for a judge to make pledges or promises that legislative and executive candidates could make.'
In In re Kaiser, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
some of a judicial candidate's statements were protected by the
First Amendment and others were not."' The court cited the
Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)(d) as prohibiting a judicial candidate from engaging in "false, misleading, or
deceptive campaign advertising.".. The court held that, under the
First Amendment, a candidate could not be disciplined for false
statements unless the candidate actually knew the statements
were false." 4 However, the court held that imposing discipline on
a candidate who violated those canons which: (1) prevented identification with a political party;" 5 (2) required the candidate to

A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office:
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his
views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
Berger, 598 F.Supp. at 71 (citing Ohio Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 7(B)(1)(c)).
107. Berger, 598 F. Supp. at 75.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 76.
111. Id.
112. In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988).
113. Id. at 397 (citingWash. CJC Canon 7(B)(1)(d)).
114. Kaiser 759 P.2d at 398-99.
115. Id. at 395. Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(A)(2) provides in part:
"[t]he judge or candidate shall not identify himself as a member of a political party." Id.
(citing Wash. CJC Canon 7(A)(2)).
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"maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office...";116 (3) required the candidate to "respect and comply with the law";".7 and
(4) prevented "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of... duties and preventing
the announc[ing of] views on disputed legal or political issues"
were compelling state interests. "'
Because these interests were determined to be compelling, the
court stated it required "a fairly tight fit between means and ends
to withstand constitutional scrutiny."'19 The plaintiff judge conceded that the canons were facially valid and instead unsuccessfully argued that they were unconstitutional as applied to him."'
The court held that statements that the judge was a "tough nononsense judge" were protected by the First Amendment because
they related to qualifications."' In contrast, the court held that
other statements were not protected by the First Amendment, including a statement that implied the judge's party affiliation,
statements that the judge was "toughest on drunk driving," and
statements that the judge's opponent received most of his financial
support from drunk driver defense attorneys, whose "primary interests are getting their clients off.""'
B.

CampaignActivities

Another source of tension between judicial ethics provisions and
the First Amendment has been in the area of campaign activities.

116. Kaiser, 759 P.2d at 396. Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)(a)
provides in part: "A candidate, including an incumbent judge ... should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office." Id. (citingWash. CJC Canon 7(B)(1)(a)).
117. Kaiser, 759 P.2d at 396. Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(A) provides:
"A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in
a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Id. (citing Wash. CJC Canon 2(A)).
118. Kaiser, 759 P.2d at 395. Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)(c)
provides in part: "(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge ... (c) should not make
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance
of the duties of the office [or] announce his views on disputed legal or political issues." Id.
(citing Wash. CJC Canon 7(B)(1)(c)). The Washington Code also provides in its first canon
the state's interests for maintaining the judicial canons: "An independent and honorable
judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe high standards of conduct so
that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved." Washington Code
of Judicial Conduct Canon 1.
119. Kaiser, 759 P.2d at 399.
120. Id. at 400.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 395-96, 400.
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Several courts have considered challenges to campaign restrictions as violative of the judicial candidate's First Amendment
rights.
In Suster v. Marshall, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit was faced with a First Amendment challenge to
two Ohio Judicial Canons. The court determined that the first,
Judicial Canon VII(C)(6), which limited the amount of money a
candidate could spend in a judicial campaign, violated the First
Amendment.12 3 The Eighth Circuit found that a candidate did not
waive his or her First Amendment rights simply because he or she
decided to seek a judicial office, rather than a non-judicial one.12
The opinion further stated that the only state interest compelling
enough to infringe upon the First Amendment rights of a candi-

date was the prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption."' Because the canon was not narrowly tailored to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption, it was not the least restrictive means to achieve the state's interest. Rather, a limit on
campaign contributions would provide a less restrictive means to
that end.16
The court held that the second challenged provision, Ohio's
Canon VII(C)(8), which prohibited candidates from using money
123. Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1114 (1999).
Ohio Judicial Canon VII (C) (6) stated, in part,
The total amount of expenditures made in the fund raising period allowed by division
(C) (4) of this Canon by the campaign committee of a judicial candidate shall not exceed the following:
(a) Five hundred thousand dollars in the case of a judicial candidate for chief
justice of the Supreme Court;
(b) Three hundred fifty thousand dollars in the case of a judicial candidate for
justice of the Supreme Court;
(c) One hundred thousand dollars in the case of a judicial candidate for the
court of appeals;
(d) Seventy-five thousand dollars in the case of a judicial candidate for the
court of common pleas;
(e) Fifty thousand dollars in the case of a judicial candidate for municipal or
county court.
Suster, 149 F.3d at 525 n.1 (citing Ohio Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon VII(C)(6)). Because
the canon was amended after the trial court had ruled, the Court of Appeals would only
review for appropriateness of the district court's action under the former version of the
canon and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the constitutionality of the
amended version of Canon VII(C)(6). Suster, 149 F.3d at 525.
124. Id. at 529.
125. Id. at 532 (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-497 (1985)).
126. Suster, 149 F.3d at 533. On remand, the District Court held that the revised version
of Canon VII(C)(6), which limited expenditures in varying amounts based on the population
in the election district also violated the First Amendment. Suster v. Marshall, 121 F.
Supp.2d 1141 (N.D. Ohio 2000).

Winter 2003

Judicial Ethics Advisory Committees

291

raised in a previous non-judicial campaign in a subsequent judicial campaign, was constitutional. 127 The court determined that
Canon VII(C)(8) was narrowly tailored to avoid corruption or the
appearance of corruption because it prevented judicial candidates
from using funds which may have been part of a candidate's
agreement (in the non-judicial election) to advance or take on
some political issue or cause.121
In Zeller v. The Florida Bar, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida held that certain provisions of
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, which limited the time for
spending campaign funds, establishing a campaign committee,
soliciting public support, and soliciting campaign contributions to
one year before an election violated the First Amendment.129 The
defendants in Zeller conceded that the restrictions on spending
judicial campaign funds and soliciting public support (including
the establishment of a committee to solicit such support) were facially unconstitutional. 3 ' The court thus focused on whether the
ban on soliciting contributions for a judicial campaign earlier than
one year before the general election, including establishing a
committee to solicit such contributions, was constitutional.'
The district court noted that two First Amendment rights were
restricted: the right of political expression of supporters to solicit
the public for contributions and the right of political association of
supporters to contribute funds. 3 2 Thus, under the Supreme
127. Suster, 149 F.3d at 534.
128. Suster, 149 F.3d at 534.
129. Zeller v. The Florida Bar, 909 F.Supp. 1518 (N.D.Fla. 1995). The Florida Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 7(C)(1) provided that:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public
election between competing candidates shall not personally solicit. campaign funds, or
solicit attorneys for publicly stated support, but may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate's campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his or her candidacy. Such
committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public support from any person or corporation authorized by law. A candidate should not expend funds in furtherance of his or her judicial campaign or establish a committee to
solicit contributions or public support earlierthan one year before the general election.
Zeller, 909 F.Supp. at 1520 (citing Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(C)(1) (emphasis added).
Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(A)(3)(c) additionally mandates "that all
judges and judicial candidates 'shall not authorize or knowingly permit any other person to
do for the candidate what the candidate is prohibited from doing under the Sections of this
Canon.'" Zeller, 909 F.Supp. at 1520-21 (citing Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
7(A)(3)(c)).
130. Zeller, 909 F.Supp. at 1522-23.
131. Id. at 1523.
132. Id. at 1524.
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Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, canons restricting political
expression would be subject to "exacting scrutiny" while the restrictions on political association would be permissible "if the
State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs
means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms."'33 The district court held that the state's admittedly compelling interests of avoiding corruption or the appearance of corruption were not sufficiently connected to the ban on
soliciting campaign contributions for a long time without contributing to corruption.' The court held that many other less restrictive means of advancing the State's interests were already in place
and thus the provisions of the canons were unconstitutional.'
In In re Fadeley, the Oregon Supreme Court considered a provi-

sion of Oregon's Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibited a judi3
cial candidate from personally soliciting campaign contributions."
The court noted that seeking funds for elective office was political
speech protected by the First Amendment and subject to exacting
scrutiny. "' The provision was upheld as against a First Amend133. Id. at 1523-24 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
134. Zeller, 909 F. Supp. at 1525.
135. Id. at 1527-28. Judicial candidates are proscribed from participating in partisan
political activity, Fla. Stat. 105.071 (1993); Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 7A(1),
7C(3), as well as from accepting the assistance of partisan political organizations. See Fla.
Stat. 105.09. In addition, judicial candidates cannot "make pledges or promises of conduct
in office," or "make statements that commit or appear to commit ...
to cases controversies or
issues that are likely to come before the court." Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
7A(3)(d). Furthermore, judicial candidates are foreclosed from personally soliciting campaign funds, and must instead establish separate committees to solicit for and collect campaign contributions. Id. at Canon 7C(1). Judicial candidates must also comply with state
campaign finance disclosure laws. See Fla. Stat. 105.08(1); Fla. Stat. ch. 106. Finally, the
Judicial Code provides that sitting judges should keep informed about their financial interests, and disqualify themselves "in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned ..." Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E. Id.
136. 802 P.2d 31 (1990). Canons 7B(7) and 7D of the Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct
provide:
7B. A judge may not:
(7) personally solicit campaign contributions; but a judge may establish committees to secure and manage financing and expenses to promote the judge's
election and to obtain public statements of support for the jduge's candidacy;
7D. The provisions of this canon apply to each judge in the state at all times and to
any other person who becomes a candidate for an elective judicial office. A person becomes a candidate for an elective judicial office when the person announces the candidacy or when steps are taken, with the person's approval, to place his or her name
on an election ballot.
Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 36 (citing Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B).
137. Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 41 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)). (Regulation of the speech involved in campaign funds "may be sustained if the State demonstrates
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ment challenge because the state's interest in the integrity and
of integrity of the judiciary justified the regulathe appearance
13 8
tion.
C.

Non-CampaignSpeech

The previous cases focused on judicial speech within the confines of judicial elections. The following cases examine the constitutionality of speech restrictions imposed on judges while in office.
In In re Sanders, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
the First Amendment precluded disciplining a Supreme Court justice who, minutes after being sworn into office, had spoken to a
pro-life rally which was held nearby and had left after speaking.'3 9
The disciplinary body in Sanders decided that the justice had violated multiple canons of the Washington Code of Judicial Conduct.' ° The court found that "Canon 1 embodies the interests
a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms.") Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 41.
138. Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 44.
139. In re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369 (Wash. 1998).
140. Id. at 372, 376. The Canons involved were Canons 1, 2(B) and 7(A)(5).
Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.
Judges should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards
of judicial conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity
and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code are
to be construed and applied to further that objective.
Id. at 372 (citing Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1).
Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(B):
Judges should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence their judicial conduct or judgment. Judges should not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor should judges convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence them.
Judges should not testify voluntarily as character witnesses.
Sanders, 955 P.2d at 376 (citingWashington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(B)).
Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(A):
(A) Political Conduct in General.
(1) Judges or candidates for election to judicial office shall not:
act as leaders or hold any office in a political organization;
(a)
(b)
make speeches for a political organization or nonjudicial candidate
or publicly endorse a nonjudicial candidate for public office;
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment or make a contribution to a political organization or nonjudicial candidate;
(d) attend political functions sponsored by political organizations or
purchase tickets for political party dinners or other functions, except as
authorized by Canon 7(A)(2);
(e) identify themselves as members of a political party, except as necessary to vote in an election;
(f) contribute to a political party, a political organization or nonjudicial
candidate.
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against which a judge's First Amendment rights must be balanced, but in this case it is these rights and interests that are in
conflict." 14'

The Washington Supreme Court went on to observe

that Canon 7(A)(5)'s ban on political activity must be considered in
light of Canon l's requirement that judges act to maintain an impartial judiciary.4 4 Because First Amendment rights were at issue, labeling conduct as "political or nonpolitical, partisan or nonpartisan, controversial or non-controversial" was not determinative of whether Canon 7(A)(5) was violated. 43 Instead the rights
and interests of the judge must be identified and balanced against
the interests of the state.4 Thus,
[t]he competing interests at stake here are the government's
interest in a fair and impartial judiciary, a judge's interest in
the right to express his or her views, and the need for the free
expression of those views in a system wherein members of the
judiciary are elected to office by the vote of the people. The
interest embodied in Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
calls upon judges to preserve the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary by establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high
standards of judicial
conduct. Without question, this interest
5
is compelling.

However, this court stated (like several cases above) that persons do not lose their First Amendment rights when they become
judges; thus, the restriction on First Amendment activities must

(2)
during judicial campaigns, judges or candidates for election to judicial office may attend political gatherings, including functions sponsored by political
organizations, and speak to such gatherings on their own behalf or that of another judicial candidate.
(3)
Judges may contribute to, but shall not solicit funds for another judicial
candidate.
(4) Judges shall resign from office when they become candidates either in a
primary or in a general election for a nonjudicial office, except that they may
continue to hold office while being a candidate for election to or serving as a
delegate in a state constitutional convention, if they are otherwise permitted by
law to do so.
(5) Judges should not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of
measures to improve the law, the legal system or the administration of justice.
Sanders, 955 P.2d at 372, n.2 (citing Washington Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(A)).
141. Sanders, 955 P.2d at 372.
142. Id. at 373.
143. Id. at 374.
144. Id.
145. Id. (citations omitted).

Winter 2003

Judicial Ethics Advisory Committees

295

survive strict scrutiny.146 Moreover, because judicial discipline
was involved, the state's restriction was subject to even "stricter
scrutiny." 147 The court required "clear and convincing evidence of
conduct that threatened or compromised the integrity or appearance of impartiality of the judiciary."48 Because there was no evidence that the judge's conduct constituted an express or implied
promise to decide any issues in a particular way, or to be impartial, this conduct did not violate the canon. 149 Additionally, Canon
2(B) was not violated because the justice did not use his judgeship
to achieve an "economic or other advantage" for himself or another
by attending and speaking at the rally."'
In In re Schenck, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 1, 2A, 3C(1), and 3A(6) did
not violate the United States Constitution."' The court upheld the
imposition of discipline against a judge who failed to disqualify
himself from a proceeding where his impartiality was called into
question on the basis of past run-ins with an attorney who had
filed an ethics complaint against him After a lawyer filed an ethics complaint against a judge, the judge had harsh words with the
lawyer in private, publicly criticized the lawyer, and publicly
146. Sanders, 955 P.2d at 374-375.
147. Id. at 375-76.
148. Id. at 376.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 377.
151. In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185 (Or. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 71 (1994). Oregon
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 provided:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A
judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing, and should observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied
to further that objective.
Id. at 189 (citing Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1).
Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A provided "[a] judge should respect and
comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Schenck, 870 P.2d at 189 (citing
Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A)
Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3C(1) provided, in part, "[a] judge should
disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned..." Schenck, 870 P.2d at 190 (citing Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 3C(1)).
Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(6) provided:
A judge should abstain from public comment about pending or impending proceedings in any court and should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel
subject to the judge's discretion and control. This subsection does not prohibit a
judge from making public statements in the course of official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court.
Schenck, 870 P.2d at 200 (citing Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(6)).
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stated that the ethics complaint had no merit. 52 The lawyer then
filed a motion to disqualify the judge from acting in a case in
which the lawyer represented a party.15 The judge denied the motion.154 The next time the lawyer represented a party before the
In opposing
judge, the lawyer filed another motion to disqualify.'
discipline for denying the motion to disqualify, the judge argued
that Canon 3C(1) violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause because it did not give adequate notice of the conduct which
it banned."' The court rejected the argument because the canon
merely required the judge to determine whether there was an "objective factual basis for a57party or lawyer reasonably to question
the judge's impartiality."
The judge also made public comments in a letter to the editor
and in a guest editorial about pending or impending cases and
about the lack of competence, experience, maturity, and professional demeanor of the District Attorney."' The judge argued that
the First Amendment, and the Oregon state equivalent thereof9
him under Canons 1, 2A and 3A(6) for
prohibited disciplining
16
'
statements.
these
The court disagreed."1' It noted that the First Amendment issues could be analyzed under two lines of First Amendment cases:
cases involving matters of public concern,16 or cases involving public employee speech."6 The court stated that it would reach the
same result regardless of which line of cases it used, but the court
used the public employee speech cases." 4
In public employee speech cases, the public employee's right to
comment on matters of public interest must be weighed against
"the interest of the state as an employer in regulating the speech
of its employees, to promote the efficiency of the public services

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
(1968).
164.

Schenck, 870 P.2d at 189-90, 200.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
Schenck, 870 P.2d at 196.
Id. at 200.
OR. CONST. art. I, §8.
Schenck, 870 P.2d at 202.
Id. at 204.
Id. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Schenck, 870 P.2d at 204. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563
Schenck, 870 P.2d at 204.
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the state performs through its employees."'6 5 In holding that there
was no violation of the First Amendment, the court stated: "[t]he
limitation on speech in this case is directly related to, and is narrowly drawn so as to further, the governmental interest in maintaining the fact and the appearance of an impartial judiciary, and
is justified by the profound nature of that interest."'66
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia discussed a
judge's First Amendment right to speak publicly about a past disciplinary proceeding against him in In re Hey.'67 In a radio interview, the judge stated that a member of a hearing board who had
recommended the judge be censured for statements the judge had
made on a television show walked out while the hearing board
1 " The judge also stated
viewed a videotape of the television show.
that he was "not done with her [the board member] yet." 69 As a
result of the judge's statements on the radio, charges were filed
against the judge alleging that he violated Canon 1, Canon 2A,
and Canon 3A(6) of the West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics,
which were very similar to the canons discussed in Schenck. 7 °
The board that heard the charges recommended they be dismissed. The court agreed, finding that there was insufficient evidence of any violation. 7' Nevertheless, because of the "vital im-

165. Id., citing Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 588.
166. Schenck, 870 P.2d at 205.
167. 452 S.E.2d 24 (W.Va. 1994).
168. Id. at 27.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 26. West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics Canon 1 provided:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A
judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should
himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and
applied to further that objective.
Id. at 28, n.4 (citingWest Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics Canon 1).
West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics Canon 2A provided "[a] judge should respect and
comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Hey, 452 S.E.2d at 28,
n. 4 (citing West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics Canon 2A).
West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics Canon 3A(6) of the Judicial Code of Ethics provided:
A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel
subject to his direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from
making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for
public information the procedures of the court.
Hey, 452 S.E.2d at 29, n.4 (citing West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics Canon 3A(6)).
171. Hey, 452 S.E.2d at 27-29.

298

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 41

portance" of the First Amendment issue, the court decided to address it.'
In Hey, the court noted that it had the power to discipline
judges, but also had the "duty not to ignore judges' constitutionally protected rights."'73 The court held that the state's interests
were adequately served by specific prohibitions of the canons so
that the general prohibitions in Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Judicial
Code of Ethics (and now the Code of Judicial Conduct) could not be
used to punish judges for their public remarks that did not concern a pending or impending matter and that did not violate either a specific prohibition or some other law.'74
The court remarked regarding judicial disciplinary matters:
Where the judge himself (or herself) is the target and his professional reputation and possibly his career are at stake, fairness to him and promotion of the search for truth in the public marketplace require that he have the right to respond and
defend himself in the public debate as well as in formal proceedings. That is especially so in West Virginia, where judges
are elected officials. A judge depends on public opinion to remain in his job, and the public needs balanced information
about its judges to make informed decisions at the polls. The
formal proceedings of the Judicial Hearing Board do not, by
themselves, provide an accused judge with a sufficient forum
to influence public perceptions, nor do they provide the endall for the public's need to know about a judge's conduct. 7'
Finding that Canons 1 and 2 were not facially unconstitutional,
the court commented that the vagueness of Canons 1, 2 and 3
could discourage some "from engaging in what would be protected
expression and also depriv[e] the public of their contributions." 76
In In re Broadbelt, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a
challenge that Canon 3A(8) and 2B violated the First Amendment
when applied to prohibit a New Jersey judge from appearing on
television to comment on the 0. J. Simpson case which was pending in California. 77 The court discussed the different tests which
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
Canon

Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 32.
Hey, 452 S.E.2d at 33.
In re Broadbelt, 683 A.2d 543 (1996). The New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct
3A(8) provided that:
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had been applied to determine the constitutionality of a statute
implicating First Amendment rights.
The New Jersey court considered a number of tests used to determine the constitutionality of restrictions on First Amendment
rights. The Pickering test determines "whether the speech addresses a matter of legitimate public concern;" and "whether the
public employee's right to speak freely outweighs the public employer's interest in regulating the speech to promote the efficiency
of the public services it performs."'78 The strict scrutiny test requires that the state statute be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest" and use "the least restrictive
means

available

to

achieve

that

interest."'179

A

hybrid

Pickering/ strict-scrutiny test determines "(1) whether the state
could accomplish its legitimate interest in restraining a judge's
speech through narrowly-tailored limitations, and (2) whether the
regulation exceeded that which is necessary to accomplish the
state's interests."80 In the end, the court applied the Gentile/Hinds test which determines whether a state statute "furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to suppression of expression, and is no more restrictive than necessary.
The court held that "[t]he preservation of the independence and
integrity of the judiciary and the maintenance of public confidence
in the judiciary-the interests underlying Canons 3A(8) and 2B"
were sufficient to uphold the canons.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered a judicial ethics
provision which prohibited a judge from commenting on the merits

A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court and should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel
subject to the judge's direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges
from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court.
Id. at 545 (citing New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(8)).
New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 stated that a judge "should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities" and forbids a judge from "lending
the prestige of office to advance the private interests of others..." Broadbelt, 683 A.2d at
548 (citing New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2).
178. Broadbelt, 683 A.2d at 551 (citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563,
567-70, 588 (1968)).
179. Broadbelt, 683 A.2d at 551.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 552 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075-76 (1991) and
In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1982)).
182. Broadbelt, 683 A.2d at 552.
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of a pending proceeding in In re Seraphim.183 The court stated
that the ethics provision might be overbroad for some persons, but
that because of the nature of judicial duties the ethics provision
was not unconstitutional as applied to judges. 8 4 While acknowledging that the judicial ethics provision prohibited all judicial
comments on pending proceedings, whether or not the comments
could have an effect on the outcome of the proceedings, the court
felt that the provision was designed to "insure and inspire the impartiality of judges as well as juries.""5 All of the comments at
issue were made during the course of judicial proceedings and
demonstrated the judge's partiality.'86 Finding that the judicial
ethics provision did not violate the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution on the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth,
the court suspended the judge without pay for three years, for
these, and other, violations.'
D.

Endorsementfor PoliticalOffice

In one significant case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered the constitutionality of restricting retired judges from endorsing nonpartisan judicial candidates. In McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that it was unconstitutional to ban retired judges who were
not then sitting as judges, but were available to sit, from endorsing nonpartisan judicial political candidates. 188 The Kentucky Ju183. 294 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980). The Wisconsin Code
of Judicial Ethics Rule 15 provided: "A judge shall not, while a judicial proceeding is pending, make any comment upon its merits, or make any comment which might affect its outcome or preclude a fair trial." Id. at 489 (citing Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics Rule 15).
184. Seraphim, 294 N.W.2d at 494.
185. Id. at 499.
186. Id. at 496.
187. Id.
188. McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 3 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 1999).
The court stated the question as "[wle must determine whether Supreme Court Rule 4.300.
Canon 5A(1)(b) of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits retired judges who
subjectively intend to accept future appointments as special judges from endorsing nonpartisan judicial political candidates." Id. at 741 (citing Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 5A(1)(b)). However, Canon 5A(1)(b) applied to any candidate for public office, not
just to judicial candidates. Canon 5A(1)(b) reads: "[a] judge or a candidate for election to a
judicial office shall not make speeches for or against a political organization or candidate or
publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for public office." McDonald, 3 S.W.3d at 742 (citing
Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5A(1)(b)). The court's opinion makes it clear
that the Code of Judicial Conduct applied to retired judges only when they were acting as
judges. McDonald, 3 S.W.3d at 745. Therefore, the court's opinion would permit retired
judges to endorse a candidate for any public office, not just a candidate for judicial office.
Id.
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dicial Ethics Committee (in Opinion JE-95) had held that retired
judges who, if requested, subjectively intended to sit as judges but
who were not then sitting as judges, were prohibited from endorsing judicial candidates.'
The court disagreed, holding that the Code of Judicial Conduct
did not apply to these retired judges. 9 ' Nevertheless, the court
addressed the First Amendment issue and found that the restriction was not sufficiently tailored to serve the state's interest in the
"preservation of the integrity, independence and objectivity of the
judicial system" because the retired judge was not performing the
duties of a judge. 9 '
In In re Code of Judicial Conduct, the Florida Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of several Judicial Conduct canons
that had the effect of prohibiting sitting judges from endorsing
political candidates in In re Code of Judicial Conduct.9 ' The court
observed that the state had a greater interest in regulating the
speech and conduct of its employees than it has in regulating the
speech and conduct of its citizens.9 The court also stated that
there must be a balance between the public employee's interest in
speaking on matters of public concern and the state's interest in
efficiently providing public services.194 In holding that the state's
189. McDonald, 3 S.W.3d at 742.
190. Id. at 745.
191. Id. at 744-745.
192. 603 S.2d 494 (Fla. 1992). Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 stated:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A
judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should
himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and
applied to further than objective.
Id. at 496 (citingFlorida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1).
Canon 2 stated:
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his personal relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private
interests of others; nor should he convey or authorize others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify voluntarily
as a character witness.
Code of Judicial Conduct, 603 S.2d at 496 n.4 (citing Florida Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 2).
Canon 7A (1) (b) provides that judges should not "publicly endorse a candidate for public
office." Code of Judicial Conduct, 603 S.2d at 496 n.4 (citing Florida code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2).
193. Code of Judicial Conduct, 603 So.2d at 497.
194. Id.
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compelling interest in upholding judicial impartiality, independence from political influence, and the public perception thereof
outweighed the judge's interest in endorsing a candidate for election, the court determined that the canons did not violate the First
Amendment."9
E.

Resign to Run

Another type of judicial ethics provision that has been involved
in substantial litigation is the "resign to run" clause that requires
judges wishing to run for non-judicial public office to first resign
from judicial office.
In Signorelli v. Evans, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to a "resign
to run" provision of the New York Code of Judicial Conduct.196 A
judge who desired to run for United States Congress argued that
the canon violated the Qualifications Clause of the United States
Constitution by adding a qualification, i.e., that the Congressional
representative not be a state judge. 197
New York Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7A(3) "requires
judges to resign from [their] position upon becoming a candidate
for non-judicial office in a party primary or in a general election.""' The Qualifications Clause provides: "[n]o person shall be
a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty
five Years and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in
which he shall be chosen."199
In upholding the canon, the court noted that another provision
of the United States Constitution, the Incompatibility Clause,
provided: "No Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.""' The court held that the Incompatibility Clause did not
preempt state regulation and that New York could enact "its own
195. Id. at 497-499.
196. Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980). A provision of the New York State
Constitution also required judges who were nominees for non-judicial office to resign their
office. Id. at 856 (citingN.Y. CONST. art. VI, §20(b)). Also at issue was a provision of a New
York statute which banned judges from engaging in political activity except for reelection.
Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 856 (citing N.Y. R. Judicial Conduct §33.7). The court upheld these
provisions from constitutional attack. Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 863.
197. Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 855.
198. Id. at 856.
199. Idat 858 (quoting U. S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl.2).
200. Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 859 (quotingU.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 2).
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incompatibility principle, protecting the integrity and independence of the judicial branch from the conflicting activities of seeking
and holding Congressional office."2 °1
In Adams v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that a
"resign to run" ethics provision did not violate the Equal Protection clause or the First Amendment.2 °2 The ethics provision required district justices to resign if they ran for a non-judicial office.202
The plaintiff argued that the ethics provision violated equal protection because lawyers were permitted to seek a broader range of
elective offices than non-lawyers.2 4 Pennsylvania law required
candidates for higher judicial offices to be lawyers.2 0 Under the
ethics provision, district justices could run for a higher judicial
office without having to resign, however, only district justices who
were lawyers could run for higher judicial office without resigning.2°' The court held that because lawyers and non-lawyers who
run for Congress are required to resign the office of district justice,
and because plaintiff did not seek to run for higher judicial office,
there was no equal protection violation.2 7
Additionally, the court rejected plaintiffs argument that the
First Amendment required the state to show the ethics provision
served a compelling state interest. 28 In addressing the scrutiny
required, the court noted that the ethics provision was helpful in
preventing the abuse of judicial office and in safeguarding "the
appearances of propriety."2 9 The court found "the less-restrictive
alternative of a forced leave of absence would not be sufficient to
guard the state's interests, because the danger of corruption, real
or perceived, would persist with regard to defeated candidates on
their return to the bench."210

201.
202.
of the
of the
of the
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 861.
Adams v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 502 F.Supp. 1282 (M.D. Pa. 1980). One
authors of the instant article, Judge Abramson, was, at the time of that decision, one
lawyers who represented the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and he argued in favor
constitutionality of the ethics provision. Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1291.
Id.
Id.
Adams, 502 F.Supp. at 1291.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1292.
Id.
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In Morial v. Judiciary Commission of Louisiana, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a judicial
ethics provision requiring judges to resign to run for non-judicial
office did not violate the First Amendment or the Equal Protection
clause.21 ' The plaintiffs in Morial were a judge and thirteen voters
who supported the judge's candidacy for mayor.212 The court noted
that the judge's interest in running for non-judicial office without
resigning was substantial, but not fundamental."
However, although the state had limited the judge's First Amendment right to
run for office, the state permitted the judge to exercise other First
Amendment rights." 4 For example, the judge was permitted to
vote to express his private opinion on matters of public concern
outside of a campaign and to hold beliefs without sanction." 5 The
impact on voters was not substantial because restricting judges
from being candidates unless they resign did not exclude candidates of a particular group or point of view." 6 The court held that
the state was only required "to show a reasonable necessity for
requiring judges to resign before becoming candidates for elective
non-judicial office." 7 The court observed that the state's interest
was in "the actual and perceived integrity of state judges."218 The
state sought to prevent abuse of the judicial office during a campaign, and, for unsuccessful candidates, after the campaign.219
The state also had an interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety during and after a campaign. 2 0 The court held that the
canon was reasonably necessary to support the state's interests. 221

211. Morial v. Judiciary Commission of State of La., 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1979). The Louisiana Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 7(A)(3) provided:
A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either in a party primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office, except that he may continue to
hold his judicial office while being a candidate for election to or serving as a delegate
in a state constitutional convention, if he is otherwise permitted by law to do so.
Id. at 297 (citing Louisiana Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 7(A)(3)).
212. Morial, 565 F.2d at 297.
213. Id. at 301.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 301-02.
217. Morial, 565 F.2d at 302.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 303.
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The same rational basis test was applied to analysis of the equal
protection claim.22 The court noted that the canon created two
classifications: judges who run for judicial office and judges who
run for non-judicial office. 23 Noting that judicial office was different from other offices, the court concluded that the canon was reasonably necessary to support the state's interests. 224
V. CONCLUSION

Judicial ethics advisory committees should discard the notion
that they should not consider constitutional rights in issuing their
opinions. Judges and judicial candidates retain their constitutional rights. Judicial ethics regulations are not sacrosanct; rather
they are limited by the United States Constitution. Considering
the substantial number of constitutional decisions involving codes
of judicial conduct, judicial ethics advisory committees should be
mindful of the United States Constitution in rendering their advice and, at the very least, should adhere to binding constitutional
precedents. However, to properly fulfill their duties, they should
consider all constitutional precedents, such as those from other
jurisdictions, not just those that are binding.
Likewise, the authors encourage judicial ethics advisory committees to be vigilant in scrupulously observing the distinction
between mandatory and aspirational provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.225 Aspirational provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct are by definition not compulsory. Thus, failure to observe
these aspirational provisions cannot be the basis for discipline. 6
222. Morial, 565 F.2d at 304.
223. Id
224. Id. at 305-307. An example of the difference which appears during campaigns is
that unlike in other campaigns for public office, in judicial campaigns, judges are prohibited
from making promises. Id. at 305-06.
225. In an American Judicature Society educational judicial videotape, in response to
panelist Professor Jeffrey Shaman's remarks that a judge in a mock scenario was acting
unethically, panelist Jack Frankel, Esquire, stated that in his view, Professor Shaman's
comments related to the question of good practice rather than good ethics. Videotape: Judicial Ethics and the Administration of Justice, (American Judicature Society, 1990) videotape 1, scenario 1, State v. Ballard: A Pre-Trial Criminal Hearing. Professor Jeffrey Shaman is a law professor at DePaul University College of Law and a Senior Fellow at the
American Judicature Society. At the time of the video tape, Jack Frankel, Esquire, was
Director and Chief Counsel to the California Commission on Judicial Performance. The
authors are considering writing at a later time on the subject of the responsibility of judicial ethics advisory committees to observe the distinction between aspirational and mandatory provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
226. This is not to say that observing what aspirational interpretations would suggest is
not of valuable service.

306

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 41

When judicial ethics advisory committees render advice which
mandates judges to observe the aspirational provisions of the Code

of Judicial Conduct, many of the same negative effects follow as
when judicial ethics advisory committees fail to consider the U.S.
Constitution in rendering advice.227 If judicial ethics advisory
committees consider it important to state a course of conduct that
would be aspirational, they should make it clear that the conduct
is aspirational and not compulsory. By observing judges' constitutional rights and the distinction between mandatory and aspirational provisions of judicial ethics regulations, judicial ethics advisory committees can avoid improperly restricting judges' conduct.
In short, judicial ethics advice should not be unnecessarily restrictive of judges' actions.

Under the 1990 Code whatever is not prohibited by the Code as a whole is permitted.
MILORD, supra note 17, at 33. In the 1990 Code, mandatory standards are denoted by the
use of "shall" in the text and "must" in the Commentary. Aspirational standards are denoted by the use of "should" in the text and "may" in the Commentary. Preamble to the
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, ABA COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 271 (1990); MILORD, supra note 17 at 8. In the 1990 Model Code of Judicial
Ethics "may" is used in the text to denote "permissible discretion" or to refer to "action that
is not covered by specific proscriptions." ABA COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 271 (1990).
In contrast, in the 1972 Code, mandatory standards are denoted by "should." MILORD, supra note 17, at 8. Moreover, unless the 1972 Code indicates otherwise, the canons and text
establish mandatory standards. Preface to the 1972 Code, contra Commonwealth v. Druce,
796 A.2d 321, 328 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Canon 1 of the 1972 Code and 1990 Code uses such general language that it has been observed that such language does "not establish a bright line for purposes of discipline."
MILORD, supra note 16 at 12.
227. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.

